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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a theory of pricing-to-market driven by marketing and bargaining frictions.
Our key innovation is a capital theoretic model of marketing in which relations with customers are
valuable. In our model, producers search and form long-lasting relations with their customers, and
marketing helps overcome the search frictions involved in forming such matches. In the context
of international business cycle patterns, the model accounts for observations that are puzzles for a
large class of theories: (i) pricing-to-market, (ii) positive correlation of aggregate real export and
import prices, (iii) excess volatility of the real exchange rate over the terms of trade, and (iv) low
short-run and high long-run price elasticity of international trade ows. The behavior of quantities
is shown to be on par with standard international business cycle theories that, in contrast to our
model, assume low intrinsic elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
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herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the
Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Standard international macroeconomic models, while being successful in accounting
for the business cycle dynamics of quantities, have so far failed to account for the movements
of international relative prices. In the data three patterns are evident. First, both real
export prices1 and real import prices are highly positively correlated, and both are positively
correlated with the real exchange rates. Second, the terms of trade is much less volatile
than the real exchange rates.2 Third, there are large and persistent movements in the real
exchange rates. These movements, often interpreted as deviations from the law of one price
at the aggregate level, are mimicked by persistent deviations from the law of one price at
more disaggregated levels.
Neither real business cycle models nor sticky price models have thus far been able to
account for these patterns. In the standard real business cycle model, the real export price
is negatively correlated with the real import price and the real exchange rate, the terms of
trade is more volatile than the real exchange rate, and while real exchange rates are persistent,
the law of one price holds at the disaggregated level. While sticky price models can, under
certain assumptions, generate some of these features, they fail to generate anywhere near the
persistence of real exchange rates observed in the data.3
Our reading of the evidence is that it suggests the presence of frictions that inhibit
the ow of tradable goods between countries and break the law of one price. This departure
1Nominal export prices evaluated relative to the domestic price level (measured by the consumer price
index [CPI], the CPI for tradable goods, or the producer price index [PPI]).
2Consider the most recent real depreciation 2006{2008. The U.S. real eective exchange depreciated
between January 2006 and January 2008 by 11%, whereas the terms of trade for manufactured goods increased
by only 0.5%. Export and import price indices for manufactured articles both increased by 8.7% and 9.2%,
respectively. (Price indices have been pulled out from BLS, and real exchange rate data from IMF IFS Online
Database.)
3See Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan (2002).is supported by the micro-level evidence suggesting that exporters are capable of segmenting
the markets and price to the market in which they sell. Marston (1990), Knetter (1993), and
Goldberg & Knetter (1997) provide evidence that when the real exchange rate depreciates,
the price of exported goods systematically rises relative to the price of the similar goods sold
at home, regardless how ne the level of disaggregation is. The literature has interpreted
this result as evidence that markups on exports, measured relative to domestic costs, tend to
systematically rise when the real exchange rate depreciates.
Motivated by the above evidence, our paper proposes a theory in which micro founded
frictions result in endogenous market segmentation and deviations from the law of one price
of the kind suggested by this literature. The key mechanism is that rms need to build mar-
ket shares, and this process is costly and time consuming. That inhibits the price arbitrage
through quantities traded and in the short-run makes real exchange rate uctuations endoge-
nously lead to pricing-to-market and varying markups on the exported goods. Quantitatively,
due to pricing-to-market, our theoretical economy successfully accounts for the volatility of
the terms of trade relative to the real exchange rate, and implies a positive correlation be-
tween the real export price, the real import price, and the real exchange rate. Business cycle
behavior of quantities is on par with the standard IRBC theory.
The idea of sluggish market shares that we pursue here is not entirely new to economics.
In fact, such frictions have been considered as a promising avenue since at least the 1980s.
Krugman (1986, p. 32), in a seminal contribution to the subject, states:
The best hope of understanding pricing to market seems to come from dynamic
models of imperfect competition. At this point, my preferred explanation would
stress the roles of [...] the costs of rapidly adjusting the marketing and distribution
infrastructure needed to sell some imports, and demand dynamics, resulting from
2the need of rms to invest in reputation.
In addition, such frictions nd strong support in the anecdotal evidence about inter-
national trade relations between rms and, more recently, in the evidence on rms' market
share growth after entry into a foreign market. The anecdotal evidence (H. Hakansson (1982),
Turnbull & M. T. Cunningham (1981), and Egan & Mody (1992)), based on surveys with
the CEOs, pervasively stresses the importance of long-lasting producer-supplier relationships,
high switching costs to new suppliers, and highly individualized relationships they have with
them. More concrete evidence on rms' market share growth after entry into a foreign market
(Ruhl & Willis (2008)) also supports the view that the buildup of market share takes time.
Although dynamic frictions leading to pricing-to-market seemed an attractive avenue for a
long time, due to tractability concerns, theoretical treatments of such frameworks are scant.
Two notable exceptions are Froot & Klemperer (1989) and Alessandria (2004). To our best
knowledge, our model is the rst quantitative exploration of the eects of frictions of this
type.
We build on the above general ideas, and develop here a tractable international busi-
ness cycle model of market share sluggishness with explicitly formulated micro foundations.
In addition, to make our model quantitative, we propose a way to put discipline on the new
features of the model by bringing in the data on the discrepancy between the low short-run
and high long-run estimates of the price elasticity of trade ows. This discrepancy, well
documented in the international trade literature, is often referred to as the elasticity puzzle
(see Ruhl (2008)). In our framework, the elasticity puzzle is intimately related to the idea
of market share sluggishness, which we exploit to calibrate the model and thereby assess its
3quantitative relevance. This appears to be the rst attempt to bring this evidence to terms
with the Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995) strand of international business cycle literature.4
The structure of our model is as follows. First, international trade takes place only
through matches between buyers (nal good producers) and intermediate good producers.
Second, intermediate good producers explicitly build their customer base by choosing spend-
ing on a broadly interpreted marketing (market research, design and customization of the
product, distribution infrastructure, advertising, technical support). Marketing brings new
customers, and each producer, as a state variable, has an endogenous list of customers to
whom he can sell a nite quantity of the good. Because it takes time to bring more cus-
tomers to this list, the producers face what we term a market expansion friction. Due to
the bilateral monopoly problem that arises within each match, dock and wholesale prices are
determined in the model by bargaining.
Market expansion friction and bargaining are the two key features that give rise to a
dierent behavior of prices in our model. First, bargaining makes prices explicitly depend
not only on the marginal cost of production, but also on the valuation of the local buyers
(nal good producers). In particular, export price explicitly depends on the foreign valuation
of the domestic good measured in domestic consumption units. Second, market expansion
friction makes the relative supply of domestic to foreign good in each country sluggish, and
when combined with a high assumed elasticity of substitution between these goods, results
in scant movements of the valuation (retail price) of the domestic good expressed in local
consumption units. As a result, when the real exchange rate depreciates in our model, the
4Other notable contributions to this topic in terms of business cycle models of a dierent kind are Ruhl
(2008) and Ghironi & Melitz (2005).
4foreign valuation of the domestic good expressed in the domestic consumption units goes up
almost one-to-one with the real exchange rate, and goes up relative to the valuation of the
same good by the domestic buyers. The extra surplus with the foreign buyers created by
that is bargained over by the exporters, which leads to an increased markup on the exported
good relative to the markup on the same good sold at home. Markup variability leads to
a positive correlation of the real export prices with the real import price, and with the real
exchange rate. In addition, just like in the data, uctuations of the real exchange rate on
the aggregate level are closely mimicked by the corresponding deviations from the law of one
price on the disaggregated levels.
This behavior of prices can be reconciled with the prot-maximizing behavior of the
producers in the following way. Unlike standard models, in our model the producers face
an additional shadow cost of matching with a marginal customer in a given market. As
a result, their marginal cost of selling in a given market comprises not only the marginal
cost of producing the good, but also a shadow marginal cost of marketing this good. These
additional shadow costs are target market-specic, and when taken into account imply that
at all times producers make the same prot on the marginal unit sold at home and abroad.
The main quantitative results of the paper are as follows: (i) relative volatility of
the terms of trade to the real exchange rate as low as 26%, (ii) positive correlation of the
real export and the real import price, (iii) positive correlation of these prices with the real
exchange rate, (iv) low short-run price elasticity of trade ows, and (v) high long-run price
elasticity.
In the robustness and sensitivity section, we show that all our results on prices are
robust to dierent modeling assumptions leading to real exchange rate uctuations. In partic-
5ular, our results are robust to increased volatility of the real exchange rate | a dimension in
which all models falls short of the data, including ours. Following Heathcote & Perri (2004),
to address this concern we consider our model under nancial autarky, which increases the
volatility of the real exchange about four times. We show that all our results still stand5. In
addition, in the same section we show that an intermediate value of the bargaining power is
critical to account for all the facts.
Related literature Dynamic pricing-to-market models with frictions similar to ours are
Krugman (1986) and Froot & Klemperer (1989). In light of these paper, our contribution
is to propose a quantitative general equilibrium model in which such frictions endogenously
arise from the underlying search and matching frictions. In addition, our paper shows that
this view has the potential to reconcile an international macro approach with static trade
theory by accounting for the discrepancy between the measured price elasticities of trade.
The most recent quantitative literature on pricing-to-market includes the papers by
Alessandria (2005), Atkeson & Burstein (forthcoming), and Corsetti et al. (2008). The
key dierence with our paper is that while these authors explore static market structures and
static frictions, we explore a conceptually dierent dynamic friction. For example, in contrast
to this literature, in our model permanent shocks do not have permanent eects on prices,
and the law of one price is eventually restored. Given the magnitude of the deviations from
the law of one price seen in the data, we believe that this property of our model is appealing,
as it accords well with the conventional view that arbitrage forces eventually do restore some
5Under nancial autarky, the correlation of the real exchange rate with the consumption ratio is negative,
and so our facts are also robust to the Backus-Smith puzzle. The mechanism why this happens is analogous
to Corsetti et al. (2008).
6form of parity. As Rogo (1996, p. 647) puts it:
While few empirically literate economists take PPP seriously as a short-term
proposition, most instinctively believe in some variant of purchasing power parity
as an anchor for long-run real exchange rates.
2. Three Puzzles for the Standard Model
In this section, we discuss several regularities of international price dynamics that
are a puzzle from the standpoint of the standard international macroeconomic model.6 In
this exercise, we use data for both disaggregated prices and aggregate prices. Our aggregate
data is based on H-P-ltered7 quarterly price data for the time period 1980 to 2005, and
our sample includes the time series for the following countries: Belgium, Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Sweden,
and Switzerland. Our disaggregated data are based on the disaggregated producer and whole-
sale price8 data for Japan.
A. Export-Import Price Correlation Puzzle
One of the central predictions of the standard theory for international relative price
movements is that the price of the exported goods, evaluated relative to the overall home price
level, moves in the opposite direction to the similarly constructed import price. Intuitively,
this implication follows from the fact that, by the law of one price, export prices are tied to
the prices of domestically-produced and domestically-sold goods, and import prices are tied to
6As laid out in Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995), Stockman & Tesar (1995), Baxter (1995), and Heathcote
& Perri (2002). The critical features are: (i) product dierentiation by the country of origin, (ii) law of one
price for tradable goods, and (iii) home-bias toward the home tradable good (possibly endogenously induced
by the trade barriers).
7We explored alternative detrending methods of the data, including the band-pass lter. It does not
change any of the results.
8Collected from either the producer or wholesaler of these goods.
7the same prices abroad expressed in home units. As a result, whenever the real exchange rate
depreciates,9 import prices rise relative to home prices due to their direct link to the overall
foreign price level, and export prices fall relative to home prices, as home prices additionally
include the higher priced.
To show the above implication formally, we rst derive it from a simple model with
only tradable goods and unit elasticity of substitution, and then generalize the results to a
model that also includes non-tradable goods.
To this end, we observe that in the Armington model, the overall home price level
measured by the CPI can be expressed by a trade-share-weighted geometric average of the
prices of the tradable home good d; and the tradable foreign good f (the home-bias toward
the local good d is parameterized by parameter 1=2 < ! < 1): Unit elasticity is consistent
with the values most commonly used by the researchers10. Given the formula for the CPI,
the denitions of the real export price px and the real import price pm of a country (deated





























From the above formulas, observe that according to the model the correlation between px
and pm must necessarily be negative.
9An increase in the foreign overall price level relative to the overall home price level.
10For example, Heathcote & Perri (2002) use elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
equal to 0.9, and Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995) assume 1.5. These small departures from unity do not
matter quantitatively for what follows.
8To contrast this prediction with the data, we calculate export and import price indices
from the import and export price deators,11 and then deate these prices by the all-items
CPI index to construct px and pm, respectively12. Figure 1 and Table 1 report the results. As
we can see, the correlations between real export and import prices are highly positive across
all 12 OECD countries in our sample, and the values often exceed 0:9. (These prices are also
quite volatile. Their median volatility relative to the real exchange rate is 0.56 for the real
export price and 0.83 for the real import price, respectively.)
In the last step, we verify whether the above results are also true in a model that
explicitly incorporates non-tradable goods. In order to do this, we use a more general constant













because the elasticity  most commonly used in the literature between tradable and non-
tradable goods is signicantly below unity.13
Straightforward algebraic manipulation applied to the denitions of px and pm with
the above formula for the CPI imply that, according to the model with non-tradable goods,
11Constructed from the time series for constant- and current-price import and export prices at the national
level.
12Formal denitions are stated in the Appendix.
13For example, Corsetti et al. (2008) follow Mendoza (1991) and use the elasticity of substitution between
tradable and non-tradable goods equal to 0.76, but Stockman & Tesar (1995) report a value as low as 0.44.
The share of non-tradable goods v in the consumer basket oscillates around 50{60%.























































To contrast the above prediction with the data, we approximate the price of non-
tradable goods PN by the CPI for housing and services, and similarly as before use all-items
CPI to measure P, and export (import) price deators to measure Pd (Pf). To generate the
time series for pT
m, pT
x, we rst detrend the time series for Pd=P;Pd=PN (same for Pf) and
normalize them so that they oscillate around unity. The parameters  and v are assumed to
be in the range of estimates from the literature that are least favorable to positive correlation
(v = :6 is taken from Corsetti et al. (2008) and  = 0:44 from Stockman & Tesar (1995)).
The results are reported in the last three columns of Table 1. As one can see, the previously
reported correlations remain almost intact (for the included set of countries). The reason
behind this result is a high positive correlation and similar volatility of the two objects, Pd=P
and Pd=PN (same for Pf), which are subtracted in the formula for pT
x. The median correlation
coecient between them is as high as 0.98. Now, because 1=v  2 and (1   v)=v  1, not
surprisingly the properties of the time series for pT
x and pT
m are similar to px and pm. Thus,
we conclude that non-tradable goods cannot account for the export-import price correlation
puzzle.
10B. Terms of Trade Relative Volatility Puzzle
The second rm prediction of the standard theory is about the excess volatility of the
terms of trade p =
Pf
Pd (price of imports in terms of exports) relative to the real exchange x.
In this respect, the standard theory predicts that the terms of trade should be exactly equal
to the PPI-based real exchange rate,14 and thus exactly as volatile. The reason is that, by
the law of one price, the price index of exported goods is equal to the home producer price
index and the price index of the imported goods is equal to the foreign country producer price
index measured in the home numeraire units. In contrast, in the data export and import
prices are highly positively correlated and the terms of trade|dened as their ratio|turns
out to be not that much volatile relative to real exchange rate. In particular, its volatility
is signicantly smaller than the volatility of the CPI or PPI based real exchange rates. This
property of the data is illustrated in Figure 2 for the US, and is more broadly analyzed in
Table 2.15
C. Pricing-to-Market Puzzle
In addition to the aggregate anomalies shown above, there is pervasive direct evidence
in the disaggregated price data against the law of one price. More precisely, the law of one
price is systematically violated across countries regardless of how ne the level of disaggre-
gation is.16 Here we document this feature of the data using a sample of the disaggregated
price data from the Japanese manufacturing industry. The reason why Japan is an excellent
14The PPI-based real exchange rate is the foreign producer price index relative to the home producer price
index, when both measured in common numeraire.
15When the import price data is cleaned from the inuence of the highly volatile crude oil prices|which
we do later|the relative volatility of the terms of trade relative to the real exchange rate falls further to
about 1=3.
16Our analysis here will be reminiscent of the incomplete pass-through literature that documents related
facts using regression analysis. For example, similar analysis can be found in Marston (1990).
11case to look up what happens behind the scene is twofold. First, aggregate prices exhibit
very strong patterns in this country|all correlations are close to unity. Second, Japanese
national statistics report the producer/wholesale prices of domestically produced and sold
goods|making this dataset particularly suitable for the kind of exercise we consider here.
(Standard PPI or WPI [wholesale price index] series would mix in export prices or import
prices, respectively.)
Our dataset includes quarterly time series for producer/wholesale level price indices
for 31 highly disaggregated and highly traded manufactured commodity classications. For
each commodity classication, we combine information on the export price (EPI) and the
domestic wholesale/producer price (DPI) for the same good, which, as mentioned above, in-
cludes only the prices of domestically-produced and domestically-sold goods. All these price
indices come from the exporter/producer survey17 and include 31 commodity classications,
which together account for 59% of the total value of Japanese exports and 18% of the total
value of domestic shipments (as of year 2000). To give a better feel for the level of disaggrega-
tion, the examples of commodity classications would include: copying machines, computers,
agricultural tractors, ball bearings, small passenger cars, and so on.18
To characterize the key property of the disaggregated price data, and also emphasize
the analogy to our aggregate analysis, we construct here the analogous objects to the aggre-
gate real export price indices considered before, but instead computed separately for each
single commodity classication that is in our sample. More specically, we divide the export
price index (EPI) of each commodity i by the overall Japanese CPI and use the following
17The non-tradable content of the price is thus minimal.
18The complete list of commodity categories included can be found in the technical appendix available










to decompose the uctuations of the real export price of each commodity into two distinct
components: (i) the pricing-to-market term
EPIi
DPIi|capturing the deviations of the export
price of the given commodity from its corresponding home price|and (ii) the residual term
DPIi
CPI |capturing the deviations of the home price of commodity i from the overall consumer
price index. With this decomposition in hand, we next look at the contribution of each term
to the overall uctuations of the real export price of commodity i:
Clearly, under the law of one price, we should expect that the rst term
EPIi
DPIi should
be almost constant, and all the variation in the real export prices pi
x should come from the
uctuations of the residual term
DPIi
CPI . The puzzle is that the exact opposite pattern is in the
data. First, most of the variance of the export prices pi
x is driven by the pricing-to-market
term. Second, the pricing-to-market term goes up and down with the real exchange rate.
Below, we provide a detailed statistical analysis of these two properties.
Variance comes from pricing-to-market term The two terms, the pricing-to-market
term and the residual term, covary negatively in the data. Hence, we can focus solely on the
contribution of the variance of each term to the overall variance of the import price index|














DPIi carries about 93% of the total volatility, and the residual term
DPIi
CPI carries only 7%, where var() in the formula above refers to the logged and H-P-ltered
quarterly time series (with a smoothing parameter  = 1600).
Pricing-to-market term varies systematically with the real exchange rate In ad-
dition, the pricing-to-market term
EPIi
DPIi turns out to be highly positively correlated with the
Japanese real (and nominal) exchange rate|possibly suggesting the missing element of the
theory to account for the aggregate price data. The median correlation of
EPIi
DPIi with the
Japanese real exchange rate is 0:84 (and 0:78 with the nominal exchange rate). In contrast,
the median correlation of the residual term
DPIi
CPI with the real exchange rate is even slightly
negative and equal to  0:15.19 As a result, given the high volatility of the rst term, the
median relative volatility of pi
x to the real exchange rate is as high as 88%, and the median
correlation of pi
x with the real exchange rate is as high as 0:82. Having established basic
properties of the international relative price data, we now turn to the presentation of our
model.
3. Model Economy
Time is discrete, t = 0;1;2;:::;1. There are two ex-ante symmetric countries labeled
domestic and foreign. Each country is populated by a large number of identical and innitely
lived households. Households supply labor and physical capital to producers, consume goods,
trade assets, and accumulate physical capital. Producers combine labor and physical capital
supplied by households and produce country-specic tradable goods. The tradable good
produced in the domestic country is labeled d; and the tradable good produced in the foreign
19We nd a similar negative correlation with the nominal exchange rate.
14country is labeled f.
In addition, in each country there is a sector of retailers who purchase goods from
domestic and foreign producers and resell them to the households in a local competitive
retail market. Retailers search for the producers of goods (domestic and foreign importers),
and producers accumulate marketing capital to attract the searching retailers. These retailers
play the role of intermediaries in trade between households and producers and allow us to
model the key frictions this paper focuses on.20
Following the standard international real business cycle framework by Backus, Kehoe
& Kydland (1995), the source of uncertainty in this economy is a random productivity shock
aecting the production technology of each country. The history of shocks up to and including
period t is denoted by st = (s0;s1;:::;st). The initial realization s0,as well as the time
invariant probability measure  over the compact shock space S, are given. In the presentation
of the model, we will often exploit symmetry and present it from the domestic country's
perspective only. To distinguish foreign country{related variables from the domestic ones, we
use an asterisk.
A. Production Technology
Each country is assumed to have access to a constant returns to scale production
function zF (k;l) that uses country-specic capital k and labor l, and is subject to a country-
20There is an equivalent formulation that incorporates this sector directly into the household. We choose
this way and the label for the sake of clarity. The retailers should not be interpreted literally as restricted to
the retail sector|these are any other producers who participate in the overall production process.
15specic technology shock ^ z  log(z) following an exogenous AR(1) process
^ z(s
t) =  ^ z(s
t 1) + "t; (6)
^ z
(s





where 0 <   < 1 is a common persistence parameter, and st  ("t;"
t) 2 S is an i.i.d.
normally distributed random variable with zero mean.
Since the production function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, we summarize
the production process by an economy-wide marginal cost v. Given domestic factor prices w,
r and domestic shock z; the marginal cost in the domestic country is given by the following
























The problem of the household is standard and identical to a decentralized version of
the standard model under complete asset markets.
Each country is populated by a unit measure of identical and innitely lived house-
holds. Households supply production factors to domestic producers, accumulate physical
capital, and consume goods. After each history st; the stand-in household chooses the allo-
cation, which consists of the level of consumption c; investment in physical capital i, labor
supply l, purchases of tradable goods d, f; and purchases of a set of one-period st+1- contin-






















The preferences toward the domestic and foreign goods are modeled by the Armington ag-
gregator G(d;f) with an assumed exogenous elasticity of substitution (Armington elasticity)










;   0; ! > 1=2: (9)
Households combine goods d and f through the above aggregator into a composite good,


































; 0 <   1: (11)





































































































In the above formulation of the budget constraints, we assume that the composite consump-
tion good is the numeraire of each country (c in domestic country, c in the foreign). We
do so by normalizing the level of prices in each country so that the CPI price index of this
country is equal to 1. The CPI is dened by the lowest cost of acquiring a unit of composite
consumption (c in the domestic country, c in the foreign country), and in the case of the










The budget constraints include (from the left-hand side): (i) purchases of domestic
goods, (ii) purchases of foreign goods, (iii) purchases of one-period forward st+1 - state con-
tingent bonds, (iv) income from maturing bonds purchased at history st 1, (v) labor income,
(vi) rental income from physical capital, and (vii) the dividends paid out by home rms. In
addition, the foreign budget constraint, due to a dierent numeraire unit, involves an ad-










18By denition of the numeraires, this price is the real exchange rate21 x, which integrates the
domestic and the foreign asset market into one world asset market. Since the foreign budget
constraint is expressed in the foreign country numeraire, and so is b, in order to use Q as
the intertemporal price, the term x(st+1)b(st+1jst) rst translates the purchase value of the
foreign bonds to the domestic country numeraire units, and then Q(st+1jst)=x(st) expresses
the price of this purchase again in terms of the foreign numeraire.
Summarizing, given the initial values for k(s 1) and b(s 1) = 0; households choose
their allocations to maximize (8) subject to the aggregation constraint (10), the law of motion
for physical capital (11), the budget constraint (12), the standard no{Ponzi scheme condition,










































21The price of the foreign composite consumption good c in terms of the domestic composite consumption
good c by the numeraire assumption given above.















where ul (st); uc (st); Gd (st); Gf (st) denote derivatives of the instantaneous utility function
and the Armington aggregator function with respect to the subscript arguments.
Comparing condition (iv) for the domestic country and the foreign country, and iter-











The above equation is the ecient risk sharing condition. It says that, under ecient risk
sharing, marginal utility from consumption across countries must align with the relative price
of consumption. To a rst approximation, this condition implies that a country consumes
more in a given state and date if and only if its consumption costs less in that state and date.
It is instructive to note that the above condition is implied solely by the frictionless
nancial structure of the model. Since it is the well-documented source of the failure of the
models to account for the properties of the real exchange rates in the data, we will later ex-
amine whether our results are robust to modications that would result in dierent properties
of the real exchange rate than the ones implied by the ecient risk sharing condition.
20C. Producers
Tradable goods d and f are country specic and are produced by a unit measure of
atomless competitive producers residing in each country. Producers employ local capital and
labor to produce these goods using the technology specic to their country of residence. The
unit production cost is given by (7).
Endogenous list of customers The novel feature introduced in this paper is that produc-
ers match with the retailers in order to sell their goods. Specically, the producers have access
to an explicitly formulated marketing technology and accumulate what we term marketing
capital m: Marketing capital must be separately accumulated in each country. The relative
marketing capital accumulated by a given producer to marketing capital held by other pro-
ducers determines the fraction of the searching retailers that match with this producer in
a given country. More specically, an exporter from the domestic country with marketing
capital m




d (st) +  m
f (st)
(21)
of the searching retailers from this country, where  m
d(st) denotes the average level of mar-
keting capital held by the f and d good producer in the foreign country.
The shares given by (21) play a critical role in the customer capital buildup problem
faced by the producers in this environment because they determine the arrival rate of the new
customers to the endogenous list of customers H(st) a given producer has. More specically,
given the measure h(st) of searching retailers in a given country, who are potential customers,
21the arrival of new customers to the list of a given producer is
md (st)






Since each contact (match) with a retailer is long-lasting and is subject to an exogenous
destruction rate h; the evolution of the endogenous list of customers Hd(st) is compactly
described by the following law of motion:
Hd(s
t) = (1   H)Hd(s
t 1) +
md(st)
 md(st) +  mf(st)
h(s
t): (23)
The size of this list is critical for the producer, as it determines the amount of goods this
producer can sell in a given market (country). More specically, here we assume that in each
match, one unit of the good can be traded per period.22 Thus, sales of a given producer
cannot exceed the size of the customer list H. For example, the sales constraint of a producer
of good d in the foreign country with a customer list H







Marketing capital In order to attract the searching customers, producers in the model
accumulate marketing capital m. Given last period's level of marketing capital md(st 1) and
the current level of instantaneous marketing input ad (st); current period marketing capital
22Clearly, a parameterized formulation using a continuous notion of the capacity constraint on a match
level would be possible. Since these capacity constraints are the main point of this work, we choose to focus
on this more straightforward formulation of the key friction.
23Due to always positive markups, this condition binds in our model (on the simulation path).
22md(st) is given by
md(s











Note that the above specication nests two key features: (i) the decreasing returns
from the instantaneous marketing input ad(st) and (ii) the capital-theoretic specication of
marketing: Both features, parameterized by the market expansion friction parameter  and
depreciation rate m; are intended to capture the idea that marketing-related assets like brand
awareness, reputation or distribution network are capital for a rm and the buildup of these
assets takes time. As we will later show, this feature gives rise to the disconnect between the
short-run and the long-run price elasticity of trade ows in response to price uctuations.
We will refer to this feature as a market expansion friction.
Prot maximization Producers sell goods in the domestic country for the wholesale prices
pd and in the foreign country for the wholesale export price px  xp
d when measured in
domestic numeraire. These prices are determined by bargaining with the domestic and foreign
retailers. The details of the bargaining problem are described in the next section. Here, we
note that since at every contingency st the producer can perfectly anticipate the outcome
of bargaining and cannot strategically inuence it beforehand, in the prot maximization
problem we can eectively treat these prices as if they were given.
The instantaneous prot function  of the producer is determined by the dierence
between the prot from sales in each market and the total cost of marketing these goods, and
23it can be summarized by the following expression:
 = (pd   v)d + (xp

d   v)d




Given the instantaneous prot function , our representative producer from the do-












































































subject to the marketing technology constraints (25), sales constraints (24), and the laws of





24where Q(stjst 1) denotes the conditional pricing kernel given by (19).
D. Retailers
In each country there is a sector of atomless retailers who purchase goods from produc-
ers and resell them in a local competitive market to households. It is assumed that the new
retailers who enter into the sector must incur the initial search cost v in order to nd a pro-
ducer with whom they can match and trade. Each match lasts until it exogenously dissolves
with a per-period probability h. Until the match lasts, the producer and the retailer hold
an option to trade one unit of the good per period. In equilibrium, the industry dynamics is
governed by a free entry and exit condition, which endogenously determines the measure h
of new entrants (searching retailers). Trade between households and retailers takes place in
a local competitive market at prices Pd for good d and Pf for good f. In equilibrium, these
prices are given by (16), and throughout the rest of this paper we refer to them as retail
prices (in contrast to the wholesale prices pd; pf).
In each period, there is a mass of retailers already matched with the producers H and a
mass of new entrants h (searching retailers). A new entrant, upon paying the up-front search
cost v, meets with probability  a producer from the domestic country and with probability
1    the producer from the foreign country (selling in the domestic country). The entrant
takes this probability as given, but in equilibrium it is determined by the marketing capital




 md (st) +  mf (st)
: (28)
25The measures of already matched retailers H endogenously evolve in each country in consis-
tency with (23).
Finally, we should stress that we call these agents retailers to clearly distinguish them
from other producers. But in fact, we think of them as producers that participate in the
process of bringing the good from the production site to the nal consumer.24
We next proceed with the discussion of the bargaining problem between the producer
and the retailer, and at the end of this section, we set up the zero prot condition governing
the entry of new retailers h (search intensity).
Bargaining and wholesale prices An important feature of the environment is how whole-
sale prices are determined. In this respect, we depart from the competitive paradigm and
assume that in each period, after matching takes place, each retailer bargains with the pro-
ducer over the total future surplus from a given match. We assume that this surplus is split
in consistency with Nash bargaining solution with continual renegotiation.
To set the stage for the bargaining problem, we rst need to dene the value function
from the match for the producer and for the retailer. We assume that they trade at history
st at some arbitrary wholesale price p, and in the future they will trade according to an
equilibrium price schedule p(st). For the foreign producer selling in the domestic country






















24The distribution of the added value could be modied accordingly, and it would not change the results
of the paper.























The ow part of the above Bellman equations for the producer is determined by the
dierence between the wholesale price of the good p and the cost of producing this good given
by xv, whereas for the retailer, it is determined by the dierence between the retail price
(resell price) of the good Pf and the wholesale price paid to the producer p.
Given the above expected present discounted values from a match, we are now ready
to set up the bargaining problem, which imposes the following restriction on the equilibrium










where  denotes the bargaining power of a producer25. Other prices are dened by analogy.
The following proposition additionally establishes that with continual renegotiation at
every date and state st, the pricing formulas resulting from the above bargaining problem
simply allocate  fraction of the total (static) instantaneous trade surplus given by Pf   xv
to the producer and 1    to the retailer.
Proposition 1. Assume that trade takes place at st: The solution to the bargaining problem
stated in (31) is given by
25Note that the search cost and the marketing cost are sunk from the perspective of any given match and
cannot be used to form another match in the same period, which means that the outside options of both sides
in the bargaining problem are zero.
27pf(s
t) = Pf(s




Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Given the continual renegotiation of
the price, Nash bargaining implies that in every period the total present discounted value
from the match S is split in proportion , 1    between the producer and the retailer. In
particular, from today on this is the case, and for any contingency, from tomorrow on as
well. Therefore, since it is impossible to split the surplus from tomorrow onward in any other
proportion, the static surplus today has to be split in that proportion as well. Since this
reasoning holds for all dates and states, the proposition follows.
Free entry and exit condition. We are now ready to formulate the equilibrium free entry
and exit condition governing the measures of searching distributors in each country h. This
















with equality whenever h > 0.
The left-hand side of the above equation is the expected surplus for the retailer from
matching with a producer from the domestic or the foreign country, respectively, and the
right-hand side is the search cost incurred to identify such opportunity.
28E. Feasibility and Market Clearing
Equilibrium must full several market clearing conditions and feasibility constraints.




































It says that the total production in the domestic country zF(k;l) must be equal to the amount
of goods sold in the domestic market d(st), exported to the foreign country d(st), used in
marketing by domestic and foreign producers, and nally, in the distribution of goods at
home h(st) (search cost).
Representativeness assumption imposed on equilibrium allocation implies that the
average marketing capital is determined by the choices of the representative producer:
mf(s
t) =  mf(s
t); (35)
md(s
t) =  md(s
t); all s
t;
Finally, the contact probability (st) is consistent with the average relative marketing




 md(st) +  mf(st)
; all s
t; (36)










= 0; all s
t: (37)
29The formal denition of equilibrium is standard and therefore omitted.
4. Parameterization
In this section, we describe how we choose functional forms and parameter values.
The two key parameters in our model are the elasticity of substitution  and the marketing
friction parameter : We rst describe the data targets we use for these two parameters and
then proceed with the description of the remaining targets and parameters.
A. The Elasticity of Substitution  and the Marketing Friction 
To choose these two parameters, we use the fact that our model has dierent predic-
tions for the long-run and the short-run response of imports to the relative price uctuations.
Evidence of a similar discrepancy has been documented for the data and in the literature is
termed the elasticity puzzle.26 Below we show how we use long-run and short-run measure-
ments to set calibration targets for these two key parameters.
Long-run measurement In our model, when the adjustments of quantities are extended
in time, it can be shown that the response of the import ratio
f
d to the relative price of the
domestic good d to the foreign good f is equal to the elasticity . That is, just as in the





26See, for example, Ruhl (2008) for a detailed discussion of this puzzle and an overview of the literature.
30where T denotes the underlying change in the tari rate measured in percentage points.27
Intuitively, the formula says that in the long-run the market expansion friction is slack,
and thus the response of trade to tari change depends solely on the intrinsic elasticity of
substitution between the domestic and the foreign goods. In terms of the estimates of the
intrinsic elasticity of substitution in the data, the estimates in the literature range from 6
to about 16. Here we adopt a middle-of-the-pack number of 7:9, reported by Head & Ries
(2001).28
Short-run measurement Over the business cycle, however, the long-run adjustment of
trade ows in response to prices described above is dampened in our model. This is because in
the short-run the market expansion friction limits the instantaneous response of quantities to
price uctuations. Since a similar discrepancy has been identied in the data and our model
can replicate it, we use it to quantitatively discipline the value of the market expansion
friction parameter .
To compute this, we use our own measurement of the short-run elasticity estimated
from the aggregate time series. Specically, we compute the business cycle volatility of the
ratio of imports to domestic absorption of domestic good (
f
d in the model) relative to the
volatility of the ratio of the underlying price deators (
pd
pf in the model). We label the
ratio of these volatilities the volatility ratio29 and compute it for a cross-section of 16 major
27We derive this equation in the technical appendix available online at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/ ldrozd/my les/Appendix1.pdf.
28Other long-run oriented studies give similar estimates. See, for example, Hummels (2001), Clausing
(2001), or Eaton & Kortum (2002).
29To construct the volatility ratio, we use series on constant and current price values of imports and domestic
absorption, where domestic absorption of domestic good is dened by the sum of domestic expenditures less
imports, DA = (C + G) + I   IM: We next identify the corresponding prices of imports and domestic
absorption with their corresponding price deators (deators are dened as the ratio of current to constant
price values). Denoting the deator price of domestic absorption of d-good by PDA and the deator price
31OECD countries.
This methodology of measuring short-run elasticity is motivated by the fact that in
a large class of models, the demand for domestic and foreign good is modeled by a CES
aggregator (9). In such case, it is straightforward to show that the import ratio is tied to the











(Note that we are allowing for the ! to be potentially time-varying here.) Under normal
conditions (i.e., when the supply curve is an upward-sloping function of the price and the




pf;t to be positive. But then, the volatility ratio dened by







places an upper bound on the value of the intrinsic price elasticity of trade ows , as implied



















) = V R: (41)
In particular, in the Armington model with ! assumed constant, the volatility ratio is exactly
of imports by PIM, the volatility ratio is then dened as (IM
DA)=(PDA
PIM ); where  refers to the standard
deviation of the logged and H-P-ltered quarterly time series. Note that our volatility ratio places an upper
bound on the regression coecient between the two variables underlying its construction. The regression
coecient, typically used in short-run studies, is the volatility ratio rescaled by the correlation coecient
(reg(x;y) =
y
xx;y; x;y 2 [ 1;1]):
32equal to the elasticity of substitution . It will later become clear that for our purposes the
upper bound estimate is sucient. (The main results of the paper are only reinforced when
lower values of the VR ratio are targeted in calibration.)
The computed values of the volatility ratio, shown in Table 3, conrm the low values
of the short-run price elasticity of trade ows typically found in the literature.30 At business
cycle frequencies, the median value of the volatility ratio is as low as 0:7 for both H-P-
ltered and linearly detrended data. In the model, we use this value as a target for the
market expansion parameter . However, because the parameter  is not the only parameter
that aects the value of the volatility ratio in the theoretical economy, the parameter  is
determined jointly with other parameters of the model, which we describe below.
B. Choice of Parameter Values and Functional Forms
Here, we describe in detail how we choose the functional forms and benchmark pa-
rameter values. We report our choices in Table 4.




; > 0;0    1; (42)




30E.g., Blonigen & Wilson (1999) or Reinert & Roland-Holst (1992). In contrast to our approach, this
literature uses disaggregated data and regression analysis.
33The functional form for the Armington aggregator G and marketing technology have already
been incorporated into the setup of the model.
Consider rst the parameters that can be selected independently from all other pa-
rameters by targeting a single moment from the data. This group includes: (i) the discount
factor ; (ii) capital share parameter , (iii) depreciation rate of physical capital , and (iv)
Armington elasticity . We choose  to reproduce the average annual risk-free real interest
rate of 4:1%;  to reproduce the constant share of labor income in GDP of 64%,  to target
the investment to GDP ratio of 25%,31 and nally, choose the value of  equal to 7:9 (as
explained in the previous section). Following the business cycle literature, we choose the
value of  equal to 2. The parameter H we arbitrarily choose equal to 0:1 - implying that
the matches in the economy last on average 2:5 years (10 quarters). Sensitivity analysis,
presented in a later section, shows that this parameter has a negligible eect on the results.
The remaining parameters need to be jointly determined because there is no one-to-
one mapping between their values and moments in the data. This group includes: (i) the
marketing friction parameter , (ii) the up-front search cost , (iii) the bargaining power ,
(iv) the home-bias !, and (v) the consumption share parameter : We choose the values of
these parameters to target jointly the following moments: (i) median volatility ratio of 0:7
as given in Table 3 (OECD median), (ii) producer markups of 10% as estimated by Basu &
Fernald (1997), (iii) relative volatility of the real export price px to the real exchange rate x
of 37% (U.S. data 1980{2004), (iv) standard value for the share of market activities in total
31We follow here the choice of Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995). This value implies an investment to GDP
ratio of about 25%. In the recent data we nd, for example, 20% in the United States, 28% in Japan, 22%
in Germany, and 21% in France. The OECD median is close to 20%. We adopt a bit higher number to make
the model comparable to the results documented in the literature.
34time endowment of households equal to 30%, (v) imports to GDP ratio of 12% (U.S. data
1980{2004), and nally, (vi) the share of marketing expenditures to sales on the industry
level of 7% as reported by Lilien & Little (1976) (also Lilien & Weinstein (1984)), and (vii)
moments of the productivity process as discussed in the next paragraph.
Productivity process We follow a procedure similar to Heathcote & Perri (2004) to back
out the total factor productivity (TFP) residuals z from the data. However, because the
model-implied TFP residuals are dierent from the assumed ones,32 we modify the correlation
and volatility of the assumed disturbances ";", and the AR(1) persistence parameter so that
the model implied residuals match the following targets from the data: (i) volatility of model-
generated TFP residuals of 0:79%; (ii) the correlation of model-generated TFP residuals of
0:3, and (iii) autoregressive coecient of 0:91. The exact values of these parameters used in
the model economies are reported in Table 4.
Finally, we solve the model by taking a second order approximation of the equilibrium
conditions as described in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2004).
5. Results
In this section, we confront our model's quantitative predictions with the data.33 We
identify the United States with the domestic country and the aggregate of 18 major OECD
countries with the foreign country.34 Unless otherwise noted, all reported statistics are based
on logged and H-P-ltered quarterly time series. The standard model, with which we con-
32Marketing expenditures are not treated as investment in national accounts, which is reected in measured
TFP. See McGrattan & Prescott (2005).
33In the technical appendix to the paper (available online), we describe how we map actual national
accounting procedures onto our model economy.
34Detailed list of countries can be found in the Appendix.
35trast our results, has been parameterized analogously whenever applicable. Table 4 reports
parameter choices in the theoretical economies.
Business cycle implications for international prices Table 5 reports the business cycle
statistics on comovement and relative volatility of international relative prices. As we can
see from this table, the benchmark model successfully accounts for the aggregate patterns
discussed in Section 2.: (i) real export and real import prices are positively correlated (and
positively correlated with the real exchange rate), (ii) relative volatility of the terms of trade to
the real exchange rate is about 26%, matching the value of 27% for U.S. data after cleaning
import price data from the inuence of volatile fuel prices,35 and (iii) producers price-to-
market to which they sell - the relative price
px
pd is no longer constant and comoves positively
with the real exchange rate. The same table also reveals that none of these features of the
data are reproduced by the standard model - which implies exactly the opposite pattern to
the data.
We do not report it in the table, but both the standard model and the benchmark
model fail to replicate the volatility of the real exchange rate by an order of magnitude, and
both models imply a positive correlation between the real exchange rate and the consumption
ratio (the Backus-Smith puzzle). In order to make sure that our results would not go away
once the properties of the real exchange rate are accounted for, we follow Heathcote & Perri
35To arrive at this estimate, we use the price indices for export and import prices disaggregated to a one-
digit SITC level by the BLS. We next remove from the index classication SITC-3 (fuels) from both the
export and the import price index. We then measure by how much it reduces the standard deviation of the
logged and H-P-ltered overall terms of trade (1983   2005) constructed from the BLS price indices. The
result is that the volatility of terms of trade falls from about 1.94% with fuels to about 1.32% without fuels.
We next obtain the non-fuel statistics for the United States by multiplying the volatility of the terms of trade
measured from the deator prices of exports and imports (as in Table 2) by the correcting ratio derived from
the BLS data: 1:32=1:94  0:68. A slightly larger estimate of about 35% would be obtained from the BLS
data directly (the BLS estimate refers to a xed weight index, not a deator price).
36(2002) and simulate our model under nancial autarky-described in detail in Section 7. Under
this modication, the real exchange rate implied by the model is negatively correlated with
the consumption ratio and is about four times more volatile. As we can see from Table 7, all
our results still stand.
Business cycle implications for quantities Table 7 reports the statistics on quantities.
The benchmark model implies a bit too low international comovement of investment36 (0:03
model vs. 0:23 data), but it matches the rest of the statistics well. Note that, unlike the
standard model, the benchmark model is additionally consistent with the fact that output
is more internationally correlated than consumption (data 0:4 output and 0:25 consumption;
model 0:35 output 0:23 consumption), addressing the so-called quantity puzzle. Because
most of the quantitative discrepancies can be xed by incorporating additional features (e.g.,
convex adjustment cost or home production), we can interpret these results that both models
match data on the quantity dimension reasonably well given their simplicity.
An additional prediction of our richer framework pertains to the behavior of marketing
expenditures over the business cycle. The evidence on the behavior of marketing expenditures
over the business cycle is scant. However, annual aggregate gures for advertising expendi-
tures on the national level are readily available from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States published by the U.S. Census Bureau. These gures reveal that advertising expendi-
tures are a highly pro-cyclical series; in particular, the share of advertising expenditures in
GDP is highly pro-cyclical. This observation is consistent with the predictions of our model.
36For the most recent subperiod (1986{2000), Heathcote & Perri (2004) report an international correlation
of investment equal to zero.
376. Mechanics Behind the Results
Compared to the standard theory, our model brings the aggregate price statistics
closer to the data in the following dimensions: (i) the real export and import prices are both
positively correlated with the real exchange rate, (ii) terms of trade is less volatile than the
real exchange rate, and (iii) producers price-to-market. The goal of this section is to provide
an intuitive understanding of these implications of the model.
We start by analyzing the critical features that give rise to the above patterns. These
features are: (i) bargaining and (ii) market expansion friction. We then proceed to analyze
the sources of the real exchange rate uctuations.
For expositional purposes, we study the impulse response functions to a one-time
positive productivity shock in the domestic country. The primitive shock, for which the
impulse responses are plotted, is illustrated in panels A and B of Figure 3. Panels C and
D of Figures 3 and 4 present the response of prices in the benchmark model and in the
standard model, respectively. What these gures show is that in the benchmark model the
real exchange rate depreciates following the shock (panel C), and the real export price px
goes up. At the same time, the price of the same good sold at home pd actually falls (panel
D). In contrast, in the standard model these two prices are always equal by the law of one
price, and following the shock, both fall.37 The described feature of our model, labeled in the
literature as pricing-to-market, is the major dierence between the two environments. Below,
we discuss intuitively the key forces that give rise to pricing-to-market in our model.
37An immediate consequence of such behavior of export and import prices is that the terms of trade, which
can be expressed as the ratio of export to import prices, is no longer more volatile than the real exchange
rate.
38Bargaining Bargaining sets the stage for pricing-to-market to occur by explicitly linking











t) + (1   )v(s
t);
observe that the wholesale prices of the domestic good not only depend on the marginal cost,
v and v, but also on the valuation of the goods by the retailers, xPd and Pd. This contrasts








Market expansion friction Bargaining alone, however, is not enough to generate the
observed behavior of prices. Without certain dynamic properties of the valuations of the
retailers, export and import would still correlate the wrong way in our model. The reason
why they do not is because producers face the market expansion friction.
On the macro level, this friction makes the endogenous list of customers respond
sluggishly to shocks. As a result, the relative scarcity of domestic and foreign goods remains
relatively stable over the business cycle and is also sluggish. This connection can readily be























From this formula, observe that the adjustment of the scarcity ratio d
f is hardwired to the




f +  m
d
;
which, in turn, is subjected to the market expansion friction by (25).
The implication of the market expansion friction described above matters for pricing-
to-market because it crucially aects the dynamics of retail prices, and thereby the valuation
of the good by local retailers. To understand the connection between the market expansion
friction and retail prices, consider the implication of 16 for the price of the domestic good














The above formula reveals two key features. First, retail prices respond only to the change in
the scarcity ratio d=f, and second, the higher the elasticity of substitution  between these
goods, the less sensitive they are to this ratio. Because the elasticity of substitution is set
high in our model, and the scarcity ratio moves sluggishly in response to the shocks, the retail
prices measured in local consumption units remain almost constant over the business cycle.
40To document this property of the model, panels E and F of Figure 3 present the impulse
response functions of the retail prices in response to a 1% positive productivity shock hitting
the domestic country. Comparing with similar plots for the standard model included in panels
E and F of Figure 4, we note that the scarcity ratio moves about as much in our model as
in the standard model, but at the same time these movements translate to almost negligible
movements of the retail prices.
How do these features lead to pricing-to-market? As a consequence of retail price
sluggishness in their respective local consumption units, following the shock the foreign retail
price of the domestic good expressed in the domestic consumption units xP 
d increases almost
one-to-one with the real exchange rate x. This is illustrated in panel E of Figure 3.
Now, because xP 
d is the foreign retailer's valuation of the exported good that enters
the bargaining problem summarized by (44), such an increase creates an extra surplus from
trade within each existing match. If the bargaining power of the producer 1    is positive,
this extra surplus partially goes to the domestic producer and results in increased markups
on the exported goods. This increase in markups leads to an increase in the export price
px, despite the fall of the price of the same good sold at home. Panels C and D of Figure 3
illustrate this eect.
Sources of incomplete arbitrage The above analysis leads to the natural question about
the source of incomplete arbitrage in our model. Clearly, the price dierential between the
home and the export market seen in panel D of Figure 3 encourages domestic producers to
relocate sales from the less protable home market to the more protable export market.
41What precludes them from taking advantage of this price dierence?
The key reason is the fact that in this model the producers, in order to sell more in
the foreign market, rst need to match with buyers there and expand their customer list.
This creates a wedge between the shadow cost of nding a marginal customer abroad and the
shadow cost of nding a marginal customer at home. This wedge makes pricing-to-market
sustainable and allows the export price px to persistently depart from the home price pd.
This wedge can be directly identied in the rst order conditions to the producer problem,










































































Without these additional time-varying shadow costs, markups would not be time-varying and
bargaining would not have any bite. It is the combination of the two frictions that makes
prices move the right way.
42Real exchange rate uctuations and deviations from law of one price (LOP) Even
though the real exchange rate moves in the benchmark model similarly to the standard model,
these movements arise from a dierent source, and unlike in the standard model, can almost
entirely be attributed to the deviations from the law of one price. Below, we rst explain
the forces that drive real exchange rate uctuation in our model, and then show how real
exchange rate uctuations are intimately related to the deviations from the law of one price.
The benchmark model is calibrated to reproduce the share of imports in GDP of
12% (as in U.S. data). Thus, in equilibrium both domestic and foreign country consumers
predominately consume their home good, and the market shares of the producers are larger
in their home country rather than abroad, i.e.,  > 1  and  > 1 , respectively. As we
explain below, this asymmetry in market shares, when combined with the market expansion
friction, is critical to give rise to real exchange rate uctuations.38 A similar eect arises also
in the standard model, but it is there instead driven by the combination of the home-bias
with the low Armington elasticity . In our model, this eect is weak due to the high value
of the elasticity parameter , and consequently, most of the real exchange uctuations come
from the new channel of sluggish market shares.
To illustrate the mechanism at work here, consider a positive productivity shock in
the domestic country. Such shock makes good d more abundant, and there are two channels
through which the additional supply of good d can be shipped to the households in each
country. The retailers can search more intensively (h and h go up), or alternatively, the
market shares at home and abroad can adjust towards the more abundant domestic good (
38Without the home-bias, i.e., when ! = 1
2, the real exchange rate does not move over the business cycle
either in our model or in the standard model.
43and 1    go up). This link can be established from the following feasibility condition,
h + h
(1   
)   (Hd + H

d) = (zF(k;l)); (52)
where (zF(k;l)) denotes the extra supply of d goods with respect to the previous period.
In the benchmark model, the market expansion friction impairs the adjustment through
 and , and the asymmetry implied by home-bias ( > 1 ) makes search relatively more
ecient in the domestic country than the foreign country. As a result, following the shock,
the overall cost of supplying the domestic consumption basket c falls relative to the cost of
supplying the foreign consumption basket c, c increases more than c, and in consistency
with (20), the real exchange rate depreciates.
Finally, we proceed to show that the real exchange rate uctuations in the benchmark
model can be linked to the the law of one price on the commodity level. Using the equations
for the shadow prices and the bargaining equations together with (14), (32), and (48), by
denition of the the real exchange rate as the ratio of the price of foreign consumption basket
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By the above formula, note that the movements of the real exchange rate can be
attributed here to two sources. First, they can be driven by the relative price movements of
the price of the domestic good relative to the foreign good
Pf
Pd | just like in the standard
model. Second, they may additionally come from the shadow cost dierences between the
44domestic and the foreign market (deviations from LOP), x
f  xf and 
d d, respectively.
Figure 5 decomposes the movements of the real exchange rate into these two forces to examine
their relative contribution. The rst series included shows the behavior of a hypothetical real
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and the second series shows the actual real exchange given by (53) above. From this decom-
position, observe that the shadow terms and thus the deviations from the law of one price are
the dominant force. (This prediction is broadly consistent with the evidence from Goldberg
& Campa (2008) showing that the retail prices of imported goods carry much less volatility
than the real exchange rates.)
7. Robustness and Sensitivity
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to changes in parameter
values, and calibration targets used to parameterize the model.
In the rst exercise, we show that the sources of dynamics of the real exchange rate
do not aect the pricing-to-market predictions of our model, and thus neither the volatility
puzzle nor the Backus-Smith puzzle aect the key mechanism of our model. To boost the
volatility of the real exchange rate, we consider a variant of our economy in which we assume
nancial autarky. In the next two exercises, we are interested in the impact of the assumed
value of match destruction rate h; which we set arbitrarily equal to h = 0:1 in the bench-
mark parameterization, and the share of marketing expenditures in GDP, for which we lack
45good data. We show that possible disturbance to the value of h or the share of marketing
expenditures to GDP has little impact on the overall results. The last exercise answers the
question of whether a simple adjustment cost as explicitly suggested by Krugman (1986) can
generate the same behavior of prices as our marketing friction. We nd that it can account
for some observations, but fails to account for the excess volatility of the real exchange rate
relative to the terms of trade.
We report the results of four alternative parameterizations corresponding to the above
cases: (i) nancial autarky (ii) one-period matches, (iii) low marketing , and (iv) adjustment
cost in BKK. The results of these exercises are presented in Table 7.
Financial autarky This exercise demonstrates that the price dynamics generated by our
model relative to the real exchange rate do not depend on the driving forces behind exchange
rate movements. In particular, in this exercise we assume that countries are in nancial
autarky, which increases the volatility of the real exchange rate to the levels observed in the














































The rest of the parameters are chosen to match the same targets as in the benchmark
case. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 7. We can see that for the price statistics,
changing the real exchange rate dynamics does not aect the relative price dynamics in our
model. In particular, the model still matches the import and export price comovement, as
46well as the volatilities of these prices and the terms of trade relative to the real exchange rate.
One-period matches In this quantitative exercise, we show that the long-lasting nature
of matches in the benchmark model does not play a crucial role in generating our results. The
only critical elements are bargaining and market expansion friction. To establish this result,
we set the destruction rate of matches to one, h = 1, and recalibrate the remaining param-
eters to hit the same targets as in the benchmark model. The resulting parameterization is
reported in Table 4, and quantitative results are reported in Table 7.39
From Table 7, we see that the implied statistics of the recalibrated model are very close
to the benchmark model. The only notable dierence is a negative international correlation of
investment, which is counterfactual. We conclude that the long-lasting nature of relationships
doesn't play a critical role in the model, but somewhat enhances the results. The intuition is
straightforward. Because of continual renegotiation of prices, there are no reputational eects
of long-lasting nature of relationships in the model, and all sluggishness can be captured in
meeting probabilities (;) instead of customer lists (H). This is reected in the parameter
choices of Table 4 { shutting down long-lasting matches requires doubling the adjustment
cost parameter :
Low marketing In this exercise, we check the robustness of our results against the target
for marketing to GDP ratio. Data on marketing are scant, and the estimates we use in the
benchmark calibration is the median marketing to sales ratio for the United States of 7%
reported by Lilien & Little (1976) (and also Lilien & Weinstein (1984)). We treat this value
39Shutting down long-lasting matches precludes us from matching the autocorrelation of the TFP residuals
in the model. Even if we assume that the exogenous process has a correlation of almost one, the model
implied autocorrelation is going to be lower than our target of 0:91.
47as the upper bound of this target, and as a robustness check consider an economy with a
lower target than the benchmark value. We choose 2:5% of marketing to GDP, which is the
value of advertising/GDP taken from Coen (2007) | arguably a lower bound for marketing
expenditures. We recalibrate all parameters to hit the same targets as in the benchmark
economy, and report the results in Table 7. As we can see, the predictions of the model do
not change much. We conclude that within the crude range suggested by the evidence, the
particular value of marketing/GDP targeted in calibration does not aect the results.
Adjustment cost in BKK This last exercise answers the question of whether a simple
adjustment cost suggested by Krugman (1986) could generate quantitatively similar behavior
of prices as our micro-founded frictions. Krugman argued that a convex tari would induce
producers to price-to-market and potentially account for the observed behavior of prices. In
the spirit of Krugman (1986), we introduce a crude quadratic adjustment cost directly on
the quantity exported for producers in the standard BKK model. In particular, the domestic















































where  1 and  2 are the adjustment costs for changing the sales in the domestic and foreign
market, respectively.
48In the rst exercise, we follow Krugman literally and set the adjustment cost only on
exports (and imports), i.e.,  1 = 0; 2 > 0. In this case, we nd that for very high values
of the adjustment cost, the import and export prices do become positively correlated, but
the export price is still negatively correlated with the real exchange rate. Because they also
become increasingly volatile, the terms of trade is more volatile than the real exchange rate,
and the volatility of the export price is more than 2:5 times that of the real exchange rate.40
We next try a more parsimonious way of introducing this cost by imposing a symmetry
between the home market and the export market. In our second experiment, reported in Table
7, we set  1 =  2 =   > 0 and increase this cost until we obtain a positive correlation between
export price and the real exchange rate. In this case, we nd that the correlation between the
real exchange rate and the export price does become positive, but the model comes nowhere
near replicating the volatilities of the export and import prices relative to the real exchange
rate. It also fails to replicate the volatility of GDP and matches quantity statistics very
poorly. In addition, unlike the benchmark model, the standard model with a crude convex
adjustment cost on quantities no longer accounts for the elasticity puzzle, as it is able to
match only one of the price elasticities of trade ows. This is true despite the fact that trade
ows are dampened and sluggish due to the adjustment cost. The problem is that unlike in
the benchmark model, here producer prices are equal to retail prices, and thereby intimately




d through the consumer rst order conditions (16).
These conditions x the volatility of the price ratio
pd
pf relative to the quantity ratio d
f, and
consequently both short-run and long-run price elasticity of trade ows are roughly equal to
. In the benchmark model, by bargaining (44), this tight link is severed, and producer prices
40Results not reported. Available on request from the authors.
49move dierently than the retail prices. Concluding, even though the model with convex cost
can imply pricing-to-market, it falls short in important dimensions.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that dynamic frictions of building market shares
have the potential to account for pricing-to-market, and the discrepancy between the short-
run and the long-run price elasticity of trade ows. Given the anecdotal evidence about
the importance of switching costs and the long-lasting nature of producer-supplier relations
in international trade, we believe that the mechanism proposed by us is an important step
toward a better understanding of the fundamental reasons behind the deviations from the
law of one price.
50Appendix
A more detailed technical appendix is available online at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/ ldrozd/my les/Appendix1.pdf. Here we list our data sources and dene
formally the aggregate prices of interest.
A1. Denition of Aggregate Price Indices
The real export (import) price has been constructed by dividing the nominal deator price of ex-








where EPI (IPI) is the nominal deator prices of exports (imports) constructed by dividing the
value of exports in current prices by the value of export in constant prices. pT
x (pT
m) has been
constructed from the formula in the paper additionally using the CPI for housing and services to
measure the prices of non-tradables PN (see description of the data below). In Table 2 the real
exchange rate has been constructed by us by dividing the trade-weighted foreign price level index
by the corresponding domestic price level index, after prior conversion to a common numeraire
(using nominal exchange rate),
xi  N
j=1(eijPj)!ij=Pi; (A2)
where xi is the real exchange rate of country i, eij denotes the bilateral nominal exchange rate
between country i and country j (j currency units in terms of domestic currency), !ij denotes the
weight of country j in total trade (
PN
j !j = 1) of country i, and Pi is the price index used to
measure the overall price level. In all other cases, we used the trade-weighted time series from the





A2. Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove the proposition for a generic match of a domestic retailer with a foreign producer.
Other cases follow by analogy. Dene the total surplus from a given match by S = J +W, and note
that (31) implies that at every date and state st
W(st) = S(st); (A4)
where
S(st) = maxf(Pf(st)   x(st)v(st);0g + (1   H)EtfQ(st+1jst)S(st+1)g: (A5)
Thus, we have by denition of W
W(st) = maxfpf(st)   x(st)v(st));0g + (1   H)EtfQ(st+1jst)W(st+1)g; (A6)
and by (A4) and (A5) also
W(st) = S(st) = maxf(Pf(st)   x(st)v(st));0g + (1   H)EtfQ(st+1jst)W(st+1)g: (A7)
41The nominal deator price of exports (imports) is dened as the ratio of value of exports (imports) in
current prices to the value of exports (imports) in constant prices.
51Subtracting side-by-side (A6) and (A7), and assuming that trade surplus is positive (i.e., trade takes
place), we obtain the xed-surplus-splitting rule given by
pf(st)   x(st)v(st) = (Pf(st)   x(st)v(st)): (A8)
A3. Data Sources
Table 1, 2: OECD Main Economic Indicators, SourceOECD.org, International Financial Statis-
tics by IMF (2005), OECD Main Indicators Printed Edition and SourceOECD.org (housing-services
and all-items CPI series). Table 3 OECD Main Economic Indicators, SourceOECD.org. Countries
included as rest-of-the-world are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Japan. Data for the U.S. hours worked come from the Current
Population Survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and has been compiled by Prescott, Ueber-
feldt & Cociuba (2008). We thank Simona Cociuba and Ellen McGrattan for this dataset. Price
Data for Japan: The dataset has been compiled by Bank of Japan from monthly survey of pro-
ducer/wholesale prices: Yen-based price indices for exports (f.o.b.) and domestic prices (wholesale or
corporate level prices that include only domestically-produced and domestically-used goods). Final
series have been seasonally adjusted (using Demetra 2.0, tramo-seats method) and Hodrick-Prescott
ltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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55Table 1: Correlation of Real Export and Real Import Prices
Correlation





Australia 0.57 0.45 0.95 n.a n.a n.a
Belgium 0.94 0.72 0.74 0.91 0.64 0.65
Canada 0.71 0.50 0.92 0.72 0.48 0.86
France 0.90 0.61 0.66 0.89 0.60 0.62
Germany 0.62 0.50 0.85 0.47 0.28 0.84
Italy 0.88 0.68 0.72 0.84 0.65 0.67
Japan 0.85 0.92 0.85 0.84 0.90 0.85
Netherlands 0.94 0.76 0.80 0.92 0.75 0.78
Sweden 0.89 0.60 0.74 n.a n.a n.a
Switzerland 0.60 0.51 0.83 0.51 0.44 0.86
UK 0.90 0.61 0.79 n.a n.a n.a
US 0.75 0.46 0.69 0.68 0.46 0.69
MEDIAN 0.87 0.61 0.80 0.84 0.60 0.78
Notes: Prices as dened in the data section. Statistics based on logged & H-P-ltered quarterly time series.
Except for T series, which ends in year 2000, the series range from 1980:1 to 2004:2. Sources are listed in
the Appendix.
Table 2: Volatility of Terms of Trade Relative to Real Exchange Rate
Volatility of p relative to x (in %)
Price index used to constructa x
Country CPI all-items WPI or PPI None (nominal)
Australia 0.51 0.54 0.60
Belgium 0.57 0.70 0.47
Canada 0.56 0.76 0.61
France 0.80 0.74 0.73
Germany 0.83 0.81 0.80
Italy 0.75 0.79 0.77
Japan 0.52 0.54 0.55
Netherlands 0.52 0.49 0.44
Sweden 0.21 0.21 0.37
Switzerland 0.71 0.68 0.67
UK 0.30 0.32 0.37
US 0.31 0.33 0.28
MEDIAN 0.54 0.61 0.57
Notes: We have constructed trade-weighted exchange rates using weights and bilateral exchange rates for the
set of 11 xed trading partners for each country. The trading partners included in the sample are the countries
listed in this table. Statistics are computed from logged and H-P-ltered quarterly time-series for the time period
1980:1-2000.01 ( =1600). Data sources are listed at the end of the paper.
aDenitions are stated in the Appendix.
















Notes: Based on quarterly time-series, 1980 : 1   2000 : 1. Data sources are listed at the end of the paper.
aLinear trend subtracted from logged time series.
bFor the entire postwar period (1959 : 3   2004 : 2) this ratio in U.S. is 0.88.
57Table 4: Parameter Values in the Model Economies
Model Economy Parameter Values
Benchmark Model Preferences and technology:  = 0:99;  =
2:0;  = 0:3436;  = 7:9; ! = 0:5581;  =
0:36;  = 0:025;
Marketing friction:  = 0:40;  = 1:38; m =
0:2; h = 0:1;  = 18:4;
Productivity process:   = 0:735; var() =
0:0000835; corr(;) = 0:2
Standard Model Preferences:  = 0:7;  = 0:3385; ! = 0:945;
Productivity process:   = 0:91; var() =
0:000037; corr(;) = 0:28; rest as in Bench-
mark.
Financial Autarky Preferences: ! = 0:5565;
Marketing friction:  = 0:33;  = 1:9; m =
0:32;  = 0:17;
Productivity process:   = 0:84; var() =
0:00008; corr(;) = 0:4
Low Marketing Marketing friction: m = 0:0513;  = 1:94;
Productivity process:   = 0:8; var() =
0:0001; corr(;) = 0:06; rest as in Benchmark.
One-Period Matches Marketing friction: h = 1:0; m = 0:0655;  =
0:15;  = 50:0;
Productivity process:   = 0:98; var() =
0:0000335; corr(;) = 0:25; rest as in Bench-
mark.
Adjustment Cost in BKK Preferences and technology:  = 0:7;  =
0:3385; ! = 0:945;v = 100:0;
Productivity process:   = 0:91; var() =
0:000037; corr(;) = 0:28; rest as in Bench-
mark.
58Table 5: International Prices: Comparing Theory with Dataa
Model Economy
Benchmark Standard
Statistic Datab  = 18:4;  = 7:9  = 0:7c
A. Correlation
px;pm 0.75 0.98 -1.00
px;x 0.46 0.99 -1.00
pm;x 0.69 1.00 1.00
p;x 0.61 0.95 1.00
B. Volatility relative toe x
px 0.37 0.37 0.162
pm 0.61 0.62 1.16
p (no fuelsd) 0.27 0.26 1.32
px=pd n/a 0.19 0.00
C. Pass-through coecient
0.68 0.62 1.16
aStatistics based on logged and H-P-ltered time-series with smoothing parameter  = 1600.
bData column refers to U.S. data for the period 1980 : 1   2004 : 1.
cThis setting of  is consistent with model implied volatility ratio of 0.7.
dRefers to terms of trade series cleaned from the inuence of fuels (SITC 3); relative volatility of the overall terms
of trade is about 0.41 for U.S.
eRatio of corresponding standard deviation to the standard deviation of the real exchange rate x.
59Table 6: Quantities: Comparing Theory with Dataa
Model Economy
Benchmark Standard
Statistic Datab  = 18:4;  = 7:9  = 0:7c
A. Correlations
domestic with foreign
TFP (actuale) 0.30 0.30 0.30
GDP 0.40 0.35 0.36
Consumption 0.25 0.23 0.32
Employment 0.21 0.32 0.48
Investment 0.23 0.03 0.16
GDP with
Consumption 0.83 0.93 0.94
Employment 0.85 0.80 0.98
Investment 0.93 0.83 0.66
Net exports -0.49 -0.56 -0.77
Terms of trade with
Net exports -0.17 -0.89 -0.81
B. Volatility
relative to GDPd
Consumption 0.74 0.32 0.31
Investment 2.79 3.67 3.36
Employment 0.81 0.69 0.48
Net exports 0.29 0.21 0.13
aStatistics based on logged and H-P-ltered time-series with smoothing parameter  = 1600.
bData column refers to U.S. data for the time period 1980:1-2004:1.
cThis setting of  is consistent with model implied volatility ratio of 0.7.
dRatio of corresponding standard deviation to the standard deviation of GDP.
eCalculated using actual national accounting procedures; see technical appendix to the paper at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/ ldrozd/my les/Appendix1.pdf.
60Table 7: Sensitivity and Robustnessa
Variations on the Theory
Financial Low One-period Adjustment Cost
Statistic Benchmark Autarky Marketing Matches in BKK
International Prices
A. Correlations
px;pm 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.28
px;x 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.12
pm;x 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.56
p;x 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.41
B. Standard deviation
x 0.43 1.65 0.45 0.66 0.35
- Relative to x
px 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 1.33
pm 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.63 1.6
p 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.26 1.75
xp
d=pd 0.19 0.65 0.20 0.29 0.49
C. P-T coecient 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.88
Quantities
A. Correlations
- Domestic with foreign
TFP (actual) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
GDP 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.34
Consumption 0.23 0.34 0.12 0.39 0.40
Employment 0.32 0.27 0.17 0.56 0.30
Investment 0.03 0.35 -0.05 -0.08 0.36
- GDP with
Consumption 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.99 0.90
Employment 0.80 0.68 0.81 0.97 -0.01
Investment 0.83 0.94 0.86 0.66 0.89
Net exports -0.56 n/a -0.56 -0.53 -0.51
- Terms of trade with
Net exports -0.89 n/a -0.89 -0.81 -0.99
B. Standard deviations
GDP 1.16 1.06 1.21 0.95 0.46
- Relative to GDP
Consumption 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.51 0.33
Investment 3.67 3.07 3.94 2.98 3.00
Employment 0.69 0.80 0.78 0.28 1.89
Net exports 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.20 0.14
Notes: Same footnotes apply. See tables with results.



























































































































































































Figure 1: Comovement of real export and import prices in the data. The included series




























PPI-based Real Exchange Rate
(trade weighted)
CPI-based Real Exchange Rate
(trade weighted)
Terms of Trade
Source data: Raw quarterly time series. Authors' calculation. Footnote under Table 2 applies. 
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Figure 5: Benchmark model vs. standard model: Decomposition of the real exchange rate
impulse response to a positive productivity shock in the domestic country.
66